

xdt\2ndoutline THE CONSTRUCTION OF INSTABILITY

KEY "FACTS"/UN-FACTS (LIES) FOR UNDERSTANDING POST-WAR (PRE-WAR?) WORLD

- I. Strategic bombing policy
- II. Motives for Hiroshima/Nagasaki
- III. Early postwar U.S. nuc plans
- IV. Motives for increase in nucs, H-bomb (early '49, after SU bomb)
- V. Motives for "defense" build-up (NSC-68)
- VI. Motives for troops to Europe, NATO
- VII. U.S. postwar aims
 - A. CFR, 1939-45/"Grand World"
 - B. Aims with respect to Germany (armament, division, "Western")
 - C. "Free trade"
- VIII. U.S. nuc predominance
 - A. 1945-49
 - B. 1950-64
- IX. U.S. FU threats, and "successes"
- X. Relation of SAC/SIOP to FU threat
 - A. Credibility
 - B. Possibility of successful LW
 - C. Hence, possibility of credibility and success of U.S. interventions
- XI. Relation of current plans to my SIOP Guidance
 - A. Why is my old planning showing up in new plans?
 - B. Why relevant now?
- XII. What "arms controllers" leave out/don't know (neglect of nuc threats)
- XIII. Ambiguities
 - A. Types of deterrence
 - B. Types of stability
 - C. Types of "FS"
 - D. Regions of FU
 - E. "Security" (of US interests)

XIV. Theories of build-up:

- A. "For Type I Deterrence"
- B. Second-strike damage-limitation
 - 1. Why the need?
 - 2. Why fear SU 2nd strike?
 - 3. US FS cap., threats; US preemption, FU threats

XV. How did USG build Doomsday Machine?

XVI. How Could They/We?

XVII. U.S. CIA (and financial) role in control, coups

- A. In TW
- B. In W. Europe
- C. In U.S.?

XVIII. USG willingness, to use, as instruments:

- A. Torture and imprisonment (via proxies)
- B. Destruction of democracy
- C. Assassinations
- D. Bombing of civilians
- E. Destruction of dikes, dams: flooding, starvation
- F. Coups
- G. Economic warfare
 - 1. Boycott of credit, oil/energy, spare parts
 - 2. Blockade

XIX. Need for possibility of public incomprehension: secrecy, lies, distraction, control of interpretation

XX. NATO as "Alliance for U.S. FU" (endorsement of "Mass-Murder, Inc.")

XXI. Shift from A to H bombs in plans and inventories

No real effort to "uninvent, abolish big dirty bombs on either side: even as some are replaced by "small, clean, usable bombs" for "war-fighting"; or to prevent escalation--which remains as threat in order to limit nuc wars, and make them winnable, usable.

XXII. New CF Race: 1967-87

- A. MIRVs
- B. Accuracy
- C. MMIII/improved 1977
- D. BS-18/improved 1981
- E. P/CM (SS-20...)

XXIII. Deliberate Instability

XXIV. French and Soviet concerns about Germany: armed, unified, independent

XXV. U.S. concern for oil of Middle East, on par with NATO (1946

plans, on; AirLand Battle 2,000, 1982...)

XXVI. Relation to FU threats in Middle East

- A. Vs. indigenous "radicals" (or "fundamentalists")
- B. Vs. Soviet support, or regional legitimacy (negotiations)

XXVII. (Covert) U.S. attitude to proliferation, "among friends""

XXVIII. Unwillingness of USG/Pres. to seek an end to the arms race, forego testing, or forego the maintenance of CF, credible FU/FS threat

XXIX. Recurrent USG under-estimation of the commitment of TW opponents to nationalism, and capacity for patriotic resistance to U.S.-backed regimes, and to U.S. bombing and troops (like other aggressors)

XXX. Falsity of implications of public rationale for Hiroshima as a precedent

In fact, Presidents' willingness to contemplate FU of nucls to avert "non-extraordinary" set-backs (not involving need to "avoid one million US casualties" or end WWII); and to plan FS--to risk the Northern Hemisphere--to avert threats (loss of W. Europe) that are not unprecedented (like SU FS).

XXXI. US public, and USG, non-acceptance of Nuremberg Principles

XXXII. Need to demonstrate US strength and will

Some US Presidents came to office having proclaimed that the US was (seen as) inferior in strength and will. They have hence been inclined to increase and demonstrate both.

- A. JFK!
- B. Reagan
- C. Ike

Xdt\1stoutline

I. U.S. FU Policy

- A. NATO
- B. UN Resolutions
- C. Carter, 1977
- D. Rejection of SU example, 1982

II. Preventive War

- A. Ike in '53
- B. NSC-100
- C. Ike-Dulles
- D. JCS, 1945-

III. Preemptive Attack

IV. Risks to Allies

- A. Ike/Japan
- B. JFK: Berlin/Turkey

V. Quemoy Crises

- A. 1955
- B. 1958

VI. Cuban Crises

- A. 1961
- B. 1962

VII. Berlin Crises (and German rearmament)

VIII. VN: '64 Nucs/On Bombing Propensity of US

IX. N-Bomb

X. Morality/No Limits/"By Any Means Necessary"

- A. Escalation
- B. Coercion (torture)
- C. Obedience
- D. Massacre

XI. Secrecy, Clearances, and Lies

- A. And CII
- B. In VN
- C. US "Atrocities"

XII. Presidents and Threats

- A. Were they "bluffing?"

B. Could they control?
C. What were the effects?

XIII. Milgram/Kelman: "No Choice
A. Is arms race really tied to threats?
B. Are Presidents all fully "aboard"?
 1. Re use of threats
 2. Re arms build-up

XIV. Ironies of approach (Coalition): "To reject A, accept B."

XV. What Are the Real Effects of Threats?

XVI. Do Threats Work?

XVII. Soviet Threats

XVIII. Effect of Nuclear Winter on Planning